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Abstract
When Martin Gardner first presented the Two-Children problem,
he made a mistake in its solution. Later he corrected the mistake in
another publication, but unfortunately his incorrect solution is more
widely known than his correction. In fact, a Tuesday-Child variation
of this problem went viral in 2010, and the same flaw keeps reap-
pearing in solutions for that problem as well. In this article, I would
like to popularize Martin Gardner’s correction and conduct a detailed
discussion of the new problem.
1 Martin Gardner
Martin Gardner’s writing is amazingly accurate and reliable. The fact that
he made a mistake is simply a testimonial to the difficulty of the problem.
1.1 Two-Children Problem
The following problem appeared in Martin Gardner’s Scientific American
column in 1959. It was later republished in his book The Second Scientific
American Book of Mathematical Puzzles and Diversions [3] in the chapter
“Nine More Problems:”
Mr. Smith has two children. At least one of them is a boy. What
is the probability that both children are boys?
Mr. Jones has two children. The older child is a girl. What is
the probability that both children are girls?
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There was never any controversy about Mr. Jones who with probability
1/2 has two girls, so we will just ignore him and his two kids. Instead, we
will concentrate on Mr. Smith. Here’s the solution that Martin Gardner
published together with the problem:
If Smith has two children, at least on of which is a boy, we have
three equally probable cases: Boy-boy, Boy-girl, Girl-boy. In only
one case are both children boys, so the probability that both are
boys is 1/3.
1.2 The Corrected Solution
Later he wrote a column titled “Probability and Ambiguity,” which was
republished in the same book as the original puzzle [3]. In this column he
comes back to Mr. Smith, correcting himself:
... the answer depends on the procedure by which the information
“at least one is a boy” is obtained.
He suggested two potential procedures.
(i) Pick all the families with two children, one of which is a boy. If Mr.
Smith is chosen randomly from this list, then the answer is 1/3.
(ii) Pick a random family with two children; suppose the father is Mr.
Smith. Then if the family has two boys, Mr. Smith says, “At least one
of them is a boy.” If he has two girls, he says, “At least one of them is
a girl.” If he has a boy and a girl he flips a coin to say one or another
of those two sentences. In this case the probability that both children
are the same sex is 1/2.
Thus, the original problem without a specified procedure is ambiguous.
1.3 More Procedures
I call the first procedure “boy-centered,” because from the start we know
that we are talking about boys. Correspondingly, the second procedure is
called “gender neutral.”
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Martin Gardner wanted to emphasize that the problem is ambiguous and
for him it was enough to show two different procedures leading to two different
answers. However, there could be many procedures. Let me just suggest two
more procedures that demonstrate the full range of ambiguity.
(i) Suppose that Mr. Smith wants to brag about his sons and will always
mention as many as he can. In this case the procedure might be the
following:
If he has two boys, he says, “I have two boys.” If he has one son, he
says “At least one of them is a boy.” In this case the answer to the
problem is 0.
(ii) Suppose Mr. Smith doesn’t like boys, and wants to de-emphasize the
number of boys he has. In this case the procedure might be the follow-
ing:
If he has two boys, he says, “At least one of them is a boy.” If he has a
boy and a girl, he says, “I am the proud father of a girl.” In this case
the answer is 1.
I leave it to the reader to invent a procedure for any answer between 0
and 1.
2 Tuesday-Child Problem
Now we fast-forward to 2010. Gary Foshee gave a very short talk at the 9th
Gathering for Gardner. He said:
I have two children. One is a boy born on a Tuesday. What is
the probability that I have two boys?
This is Martin Gardner’s Two-Children problem with an extra twist.
Before discussing the solution, let us agree on some basic assumptions:
(i) Sons and daughters are equally probable. This is not exactly true, but
it is a reasonable approximation.
(ii) For our purposes, twins do not exist. Not only is the proportion of
twins in the population small, but because they are usually born on
the same day, twins might complicate the calculation.
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(iii) All days of the week are equally probable birthdays. While this isn’t
actually true — for example, assisted labors are unlikely to be scheduled
for weekends — it is a reasonable approximation.
2.1 Wrong Solution
History repeats itself. Just as occurred around the classical Two-Children
problem, many mathematicians have been fighting for the wrong solution.
This is their argument:
Each child can be one of two genders and can be born on one of seven
days of the week. Thus, gender and the day present 14 equally probable
cases for each child. That in turn makes each two-children family belong to
one of 196 equally probable cases. When we restrict all possible cases to the
given information that one of the children is a boy born on a Tuesday we get
27 equally probable cases. We can divide these cases into several groups, as
follows:
• 7 cases, where the first child is a son born on a Tuesday and the second
child is a daughter.
• 7 cases, where the second child is a son born on a Tuesday and the first
child is a daughter.
• 6 cases, where the first child is a son born on a Tuesday and the second
child is a son not born on a Tuesday.
• 6 cases, where the second child is a son born on a Tuesday and the first
child is a son not born on a Tuesday.
• 1 case, where both children are sons born on a Tuesday.
There is a total of 27 equally probable cases, 13 of which correspond to
two sons. Thus the probability must be 13/27.
This wrong solution was widely published. For example, Keith Devlin
published it in his column Devlin’s Angle in the article “Probability Can
Bite” [1]. But just like Martin Gardner, he corrected himself in the next
article, “The Problem with Word Problems” [2].
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2.2 Procedures
The ambiguity that Martin Gardner found in the Two-Children problem is
likewise present in the Tuesday-Child problem. To resolve ambiguity, we
need to specify the procedure by which the information was obtained. Let
me discuss four procedures. The calculation is based on 196 equally probable
cases for different combinations of gender and the day of the week.
Gender-Neutral, Day-of-the-Week-Neutral Procedure
In this scenario, a father of two children is picked at random. He is instructed
to choose a child by flipping a coin. Then he has to provide true information
about the chosen child in the following format: “I have a son/daughter born
on Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu/Fri/Sat/Sun.” If his statement is, “I have a son born
on a Tuesday,” what is the probability that the other child is also a son?
The solution for this procedure is the following: A father has two daugh-
ters in 49 cases. Such a father will make the above statement with probability
zero. A father has a son and a daughter in 98 cases, and will produce the
above statement with a probability of 1/14: with a probability of 1/2 the
son is chosen over the daughter and with a probability of 1/7 Tuesday is the
birthday. A father has two sons in 49 cases, and he will make the statement
with a probability of 1/7. The father of two sons is twice as likely to make
the statement as the father of a son and a daughter, but there are half as
many such fathers. Thus the probability is 1/2 that the other child is also a
son.
This is the most symmetric scenario, which produces the most symmetric
answer.
Boy-Centered, Day-of-the-Week-Neutral Procedure
Now let us consider the second scenario. A father of two children is picked at
random. If he has two daughters he is sent home and another father picked
at random until one is found who has at least one son. If he has one son,
he is instructed to provide true information on his son’s day of birth. If he
has two sons, he has to choose one son at random. His statement will be,
“I have a son born on Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu/Fri/Sat/Sun.” If his statement
is, “I have a son born on a Tuesday,” what is the probability that the other
child is also a son?
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The solution is as follows. A father has a son and a daughter in 98 cases,
and he will produce the statement above with a probability of 1/7. If he has
two sons (49 cases), the probability of the statement above will likewise be
1/7. The father of two sons is exactly as likely to make the statement as
the father of a son and a daughter, but there are half as many such fathers.
Thus the probability is 1/3 that the other child is also a son.
This scenario corresponds to the original procedure leading to the first
solution of Martin Gardner’s Two-Children problem. Unsurprisingly, the
answer is the same.
Boy-Centered, Tuesday-Centered Procedure
Now let us consider the third scenario. A father of two children is picked
at random. If he doesn’t have a son born on a Tuesday, he is sent home
and another father is picked at random until one who has a son born on
a Tuesday is found. He is instructed to tell you, “I have a son born on a
Tuesday.” What is the probability that the other child is also a son?
Here is the solution. A father of a boy and a girl has a son born on a
Tuesday in 14 cases. He will make the statement in question with a proba-
bility of 1. A father of two sons has a son born on a Tuesday in 13 cases. He
too is guaranteed to make the statement. Thus the probability is 13/27 that
the other child is a son.
This procedure corresponds to the procedure many mathematicians as-
sume while solving the Tuesday-Child problem. This assumption, made im-
plicitly, is the source of the erroneous solution.
Gender-Neutral, Tuesday-Centered Procedure
For completeness let us consider the fourth scenario. A father of two children
is picked at random. If he doesn’t have a child who is born on a Tuesday,
he is sent home and another father is picked at random until one who has
a child born on a Tuesday is found. He is instructed to tell you, “I have
a son/daughter born on a Tuesday.” If both of his children were born on
Tuesdays, he has to pick one at random. If his statement is, “I have a son
born on a Tuesday,” what is the probability that the other child is also a
son?
Here is the solution. A father of two daughters will have a child born on a
Tuesday in 13 cases. He makes the statement in question with a probability
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of 0. A father of a boy and a girl has a child born on a Tuesday in 26 cases.
The probability that he makes the statement is 1/2. A father of two sons will
have a son born on a Tuesday in 13 cases. The probability that he makes
the statement is 1. The father of two sons is twice as likely to make the
statement as the father of a son and a daughter, but there are half as many
such fathers. Thus the probability is 1/2 that the other child is also a son.
In this procedure we added an additional constraint on the families with
two children — that a child was born on a Tuesday — that doesn’t correlate
with gender. Not surprisingly, the answer in this case is 1/2.
2.3 Correct Solution
Now let’s go back to the original problem. Suppose you meet your friend
who you know has two children and he tells you, “I have a son born on a
Tuesday.” What is the probability that the other child is also a son?
The problem is under-defined. The solution depends on the reason the
father mentions only the son and only the Tuesday.
The funny part of this story is that I, Tanya Khovanova, have two chil-
dren. And the following statement is true: “I have a son born on a Tuesday.”
What is the probability that my other child is a son?
3 Gender Bias
What puzzles me is that I’ve never run into a similar problem about daughters
or mothers. I’ve discussed the original math problem about Mr. Smith with
many people many times. But I kept stumbling upon men who passionately
defended their wrong solution. When I dug into why their solution was
wrong, it appeared that they implicitly assumed that if a man has a daughter
and a son, he won’t bother talking about his daughter at all.
I’ve heard this so often that I began to wonder if gender bias wasn’t the
underlying source of the wrong solution.
Now we have a Tuesday-Child problem. What encourages me is that
the most common mistake is that people choose the boy-centered, Tuesday-
centered solution. I do not anticipate a strong bias for Tuesday, so perhaps
after all it’s not a gender bias but simply a mistake.
On second thought, in the father’s statement there is a symmetry between
genders and days of the week. Why is everyone asking about the gender of
7
the other child, not about the birth day?
I have yet to see people fighting over the following problem.
You run into an old friend. He has two children, but you do
not know what their gender is. He says, “I have a son born on
a Tuesday.” What is the probability that his other child is also
born on a Tuesday?
Real gender equality will be reached when mathematicians start arguing
about the probability of the second birthday being Tuesday with the same
passion as the probability of the other child being a boy.
4 Jack
I have had to defend the solution — that the problem is ambiguous — so
many times that I invented a fictional opponent, Jack, and here is my imag-
inary conversation with him.
Jack: The probability that a father with two sons has a son born on a
Tuesday is 13/49. The probability that a father with a son and a daughter
has a son born on a Tuesday is 1/7. A dad with a son and a daughter is
encountered twice as often as a dad with just two sons. Hence, we have
probabilities of 13/49 and 14/49, and the probability of the father having a
second son is 13/(13 + 14), or 13/27.
Me: What if the problem is about Wednesday?
Jack: It doesn’t matter. The particular day in question was random. The
answer should be the same: 13/27.
Me: Suppose the father says, “I have a son born on *day.” He mumbles
the day, so you do not hear it exactly.
Jack: Well, as the answer is the same for any day, it shouldn’t matter.
The probability that his other child will also be a son is still 13/27.
Me: Suppose he says, “I have a son born . . .”. So he might have continued
and mentioned the day, he might not have. What is the probability?
Jack: We already decided that it doesn’t depend on the day, so it shouldn’t
matter. The probability is still 13/27.
Me: Suppose he says, “I have a son and I do not remember when he
was born.” Isn’t that the same as just saying, “I have a son.” And by your
arguments the probability that his other child is also a son is 13/27.
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Jack: Hmm.
Me: Do you remember your calculation? If we denote the number of days
in a week as d, then the probability that he has another son is (2d−1)/(4d−1).
My point is that this probability depends on the number of days in a week.
So, if tomorrow we change a week length to another number his probability
of having a son changes. Right?
At this point my imaginary conversation stops and I do not know whether
I have convinced Jack or not.
5 Unambiguous Problem
Now let me give you a variation of the Tuesday-Child problem that is unam-
biguous and where the answer is 13/27:
You pick a random father of two children and ask him, “Yes or
no, do you have a son born on a Tuesday?” Let’s make a leap
and assume that all fathers know the days of the births of their
children and that they answer truthfully. If the answer is yes,
what is the probability that the father has two sons?
The 13/27 argument works perfectly in this case.
The reason this problem stops being ambiguous is that the exact proce-
dure of how you get your information is provided.
6 Back to Gardner
Many people I argued with didn’t want to listen to me. They referred to Mar-
tin Gardner as the final authority to support their wrong solution. Gardner
was a great thinker, and he corrected his mistake. I urge those who do not
agree with me to trust Martin Gardner and revisit and rethink this problem
together with him.
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